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Abstract
In this paper we study how congestion and residential moving
behaviour are interrelated using a two-region job search model. Workers
choose optimally between interregional commuting and residential moving
to live closer to the place of work. This choice aﬀects the external costs of
commuting due to congestion. The welfare maximizing road tax is derived.
We demonstrate that road pricing may not only reduce congestion but also
increase total residential moving costs in the economy. One of the main
consequences is that the road tax does not necessarily increase welfare.
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1 Introduction
In the large literature on road pricing and congestion, it has been recognised
that road pricing will not only aﬀect commuting behaviour directly but may
also aﬀect the optimal location of households and firms. In particular, road
pricing may induce workers to locate closer to firms (see for example Anas and
Xu (1999)). One of the consequences is that housing rents, wages and spatial
structure will change.
In the analysis of optimal location of households it is generally presumed that
households may move residence at no costs (Arnott (1998); Anas and Xu (1999);
Boyce and Mattson (1999); Eliasson and Mattson (2001)). This assumption
has many advantages in the context of commuting, because it simplifies the
analysis to a large extent. It ignores however that residential moving costs are
relevant, in particular because information on available vacancies at diﬀerent
locations is incomplete. Workers are therefore not able to find the job which
is closest to their residence, but search for jobs given incomplete information
and will therefore accept jobs which do not minimise commuting costs1 . The
commuting model developed in this paper allows for incomplete information
in the labour market combined with residential moving behaviour and positive
residential moving costs.2
In the current paper, the commuting model is essentially a two-region job
search model where unemployed job seekers seek for job oﬀers which arrive
randomly over time from both regions (so information is spatially incomplete).
Job seekers accept jobs in both regions. The basic decision job seekers have to
make is whether to commute between regions or to move residence to another
1This theoretical result is in line with the empirical literature on ’excess commuting’ (see for
example Hamilton (1982), White (1988), or Small and Song (1992)). One of the conclusions
from this literature is that workers commute further than might be thought if residential
moving costs would be absent and information on the labour market would be complete,
although studies dispute by how much.
2Hence, we study road pricing, in the context of commuting employing a labour market
model which allows for search imperfections. For other labour market studies of environmental
externalities, see Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994b) and Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994).
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region, which is costly, taking into account future labour and residential mobility.
One of the main characteristics of the model is ’excess commuting’: some
workers commute to the other region although they are not compensated for
the excess commuting costs. This characteristic is the consequence of the
combination of imperfect labour market information and positive moving costs.
Congestion is introduced in the model and it is assumed that congestion depends
positively on the number of workers who commute between regions.
One of the aims of the paper is to derive the optimal road tax given the
presence of the congestion externality taking into account imperfect labour
market information combined with the presence of residential moving costs.
In order to do so, we characterise diﬀerent equilibriums, which are defined by
the value of the incurred commuting costs (inclusive the road tax) relative to
the discounted residential moving costs.3
We examine three types of equilibriums outcomes. In the first equilibrium,
interregional job oﬀers induce interregional commuting (but no moving). In
the second equilibrium, these job oﬀers induce interregional moving (but no
commuting). In a third equilibrium, interregional commuting and residential
moving both occur. Road pricing causes then a welfare gain due to the reduction
in the congestion externality, but only when the type of equilibrium does not
change. It reduces the real commuting costs of all interregional commuters by
an amount equal to the tax. Further it reduces the number of interregional
commuters since it increases residential mobility. The reduction in commuting
costs due to the decrease of interregional commuters is equal to the increased
expenses on the moving costs. Hence, the welfare gain of the road tax is equal
to the road tax multiplied by the number of interregional commuters (after
the introduction of the tax). Consequently, a tax revenue-maximising road tax
maximises welfare. This result makes sense, because the opportunity of costly
moving induces the demand for commuting to become perfect price elastic.
One of the consequences is that a private monopolist company that levies the
3 In this paper, we distinguish between the commuting costs which may include a road tax,
and the real commuting costs which are the incurred commuting costs exclusive road tax.
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road tax would set the road tax optimally from a welfare perspective. But a
positive welfare eﬀect of road pricing is not always guaranteed. Under some
specific circumstances, a road tax may induce a welfare loss4. For example,
when commuting between regions is more cost eﬀective than moving residence
to the other region where the job is located, and a road tax induces workers to
move residence to the other region, then a negative welfare contribution may
result.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2, the model is introduced.
In section 3 the equilibriums are characterised. Section 4 discusses the welfare
implications of a road tax. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section we define a model which consists of a labour market model
including commuting and allows for moving in the housing market. Our starting
point is a model with two regions and a given number of (ex-ante) identical
workers. We presume the presence of (endogenously determined) involuntary
unemployment due to job search imperfections. Unemployed workers search for
jobs in both regions. Within a region all job are identical. Employed workers do
not search, but are laid oﬀ each period with a fixed probability. The probability
of receiving a job oﬀer in a period does not depend on the region of residence.
All job oﬀers are accepted5. We consider the case where an unemployed worker
4 In general there could be a number of reasons why an environmental tax such as a road
tax may induce a welfare loss due to market imperfections (see, for example, Bovenberg and
de Mooij (1994a), Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994b), Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994).
Parry and Bento (2001) emphasizes that a road tax reduces overall quantity of labour supply
and therefore it is important how the road tax revenue is recycled. Nonetheless the optimal
congestion tax is still the Pigouvian tax in Parry and Bento (2001). The latter is not necessarily
the case in this paper. Note that in this paper, we will see that the quantity of labour supply
is not aﬀected.
5This assumption implies that the lifetime utility of being unemployed is less than the
lifetime utility of being employed in both regions. We show at the end of section 3 under
which assumptions of job search behaviour the assumption that all jobs are accepted is valid.
4
chooses between two strategies: a commuting strategy (CS) or a residential
moving strategy (MS). The CS implies that a worker who finds a job in the
other region will commute and not move residence. The MS implies that the
worker will move residence to the other region. After accepting a job in the
other region, a worker with MS pays residential moving costs, whereas a worker
with CS pays the costs for commuting to the other region.
When unemployed workers choose the optimal strategy, they are assumed
to maximize the expected present value of future utilities, the so-called lifetime
utility. The lifetime utility can then be written as a function of the utility
enjoyed during the current period, the so-called flow utility, and the expected
lifetime utility enjoyed in the future periods. We will present a discrete version
of the Bellmann equation, McKenna (1985). We use a number of subscripts.
The first subscript refers to the region of residence (i or j), the second to the
labour market status (0 when unemployed, i when employed in region i, j when
employed in region j), and the third subscript refers to the time period.
If an unemployed worker living in region i in period t chooses MS, lifetime
utility, VMi,0,t, can be written as follows:
VMi,0,t =
1
1 + δ

 vi,0,t + θiVi,i,t+1 + θj (Vj,j,t+1 −m)
+ (1− θi − θj)VMi,0,t+1

 (1)
δ denotes the discount rate. θi is the probability of becoming employed in
region i. Note that with a positive probability equal to 1−θi−θj the unemployed
worker will remain unemployed. Residential moving costs, m, incurred if the
worker moves to another region, are paid at the beginning of the period in
which the move takes place. Vi,i,t+1 denotes the lifetime utility of an employed
worker living and working in region i in period t + 1. Lifetime utility of an
unemployed who chooses MS can thus be written as the sum of flow utility,
vi,0,t, and the expected utility of finding employment in region i. The flow
It should be noted that the unemployed would only search in a region if the probability
of acceptance is positive. Given identical jobs in a region this implies the probability of
acceptance is one.
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utility of being unemployed, vi,0,t, is exogenously given for the individual and
may include unemployment benefit, but may depend on regional characteristics
such as the regional housing rent6.
The lifetime utility of the employed living in i and working in i at time t,
Vi,i,t, is determined by the employed’s flow utility, vi,i,t, the probability of being
laid oﬀ, λi, and the discount rate and can be written as:
Vi,i,t =
1
1 + δ

vi,i,t + λimax

VMi,0,t+1, V
C
i,0,t+1

+ (1− λi)Vi,i,t+1

(2)
The probability of being laid oﬀ determines the probability of staying
employed or becoming unemployed in the next period, t + 1. If the worker
is laid oﬀ, he will choose the strategy (MS or CS) that maximizes his lifetime
utility. At the end of period t the employed worker receives the flow utility vi,i,t.
This flow utility is thought to consist of labour income (wage), commuting costs,
but may also depend on housing rent.
From now, we will consider only the steady state and ignore the subscript, t,
so, VMi,0,t = V
M
i,0,t+1 = V
M
i,0 . Given the choice of moving residence, lifetime utility,
VMi,0 , can be expressed in terms of flow utilities and exogenous parameters (see
Appendix A):
VMi,0 =
1
δ
(µ1 (vi,0 − θjm) + µ2 (vj,0 − θim) + µ3vi,i + µ4vj,j) (3)
where
µ1 =
1−
λj
θj
δ+λj
δ+θi+θj
1 + θiδ+λi +
θj
δ+λj
, µ2 =
λj
θj
δ+λj
δ+θi+θj
1 + θiδ+λi +
θj
δ+λj
µ3 =
θi
δ+λi
1 + θiδ+λi +
θj
δ+λj
, µ4 =
θj
δ+λj
1 + θiδ+λi +
θj
δ+λj
Let us interpret equation (3). The term ” 1δ” applies since the future is
discounted at rate δ. It can be easily seen that µ1 + µ2 + µ3 + µ4 = 1 and
6 In the next section we will specify the flow utilities.
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the µ3s can therefore be interpreted as the weight attached of being in a certain
combined labour/ housing market state. We distinguish between four weights
associated with labour/ housing market states: being unemployed in region i
(µ1), being unemployed in region j (µ2), being employed region i (µ3), or being
employed in region j (µ4). These weights depend on the exogenous parameters
δ, θi, θj , λi, and λj . The discounted lifetime utility of being unemployed, VMi,0 ,
can be written as the weighted average of flow utilities taking the expected
moving costs (θim and θjm) into account.
In a similar way as above, the steady state lifetime utility V Ci,0 of an
unemployed worker choosing CS can be written as:
V Ci,0 =
1
δ
((µ1 + µ2) vi,0 + µ3vi,i + µ4vi,j) (4)
Hence, lifetime utility V Ci,0 can be written as the weighted sum of flow
utilities, where the same weights are used as in equation (3).
3 Spatial Equilibrium
In this section we will characterize the spatial equilibrium in the labour/ housing
market. The equilibrium is defined such that no unemployed worker would gain
from choosing another strategy in each period. Hence, the unemployed who find
a job in the other region and decide to commute to the job will not gain from
moving residence to the other region. Similarly, the unemployed who find a job
in the other region and decide to move will not gain from not move and commute
instead. First, we suppose that the flow utility vi,j can be decomposed into a
region j work-related utility flow, a region i related residence-related utility flow,
and a region i and j commuting-related utility flow. So the flow utility vi,j is
an additive function of the work-related utility flow wj , the residence-related
utility flow ai, and the costs of commuting ci,j , between regions i and j. So:
vi,j = wj − ai − ci,j (5)
For example, wj and ai may be interpreted as the wage earned in region j
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and the housing rent paid in region i respectively. For notational convenience,
we standardise ci,i = cj,j = 0, so intraregional commuting costs are zero7.
In equilibrium interregional commuting and moving to the other region may,
or may not occur. Let us consider the case where both interregional commuting
and moving between regions occur. This implies that the lifetime utility of
an unemployed worker who selects MS must equal the lifetime utility of an
unemployed worker who choose CS, so the unemployed worker is indiﬀerent
between two strategies, VMi,0 = V
C
i,0. Hence using equation (3) and (4) in
equilibrium the following condition must hold:
µ2 (vj,0 − vi,0) + µ4 (vj,j − vi,j) = (µ1θj + µ2θi)m (6)
This equilibrium condition shows that the sum of the weighted regional
diﬀerences in the flow utilities is equal to the expected moving costs. The
regional diﬀerence in the flow utilities are weighted with the probability of
being employed or unemployed in region j (µ2 and µ4), so both size of the
regional diﬀerence in the flow utility as well as how often the worker expects
to be employed or unemployed matter. For example, it could be the case that
the flow utility of being unemployed is not region specific, so vj,0 = vi,0. In this
case, it appears a necessary condition for equilibrium is that vj,j > vi,j. When
the flow utilities defined by equation (5) are substituted into equation (6) then
the equilibrium condition can be reformulated as:
(µ2 + µ4) (ai − aj) + µ4ci,j = (µ1θj + µ2θi)m (7)
This shows that the sum of the regional weighted diﬀerence in housing rent
and the interregional commuting costs is equal to the expected moving costs.
Equilibrium condition (7) does not depend on diﬀerence in the regional wages
(wi − wj). This occurs because the location of residence does not influence
where you expect to find a job in the future8. If the housing rent is lower in
7Presuming positive intraregional commuting costs does not change any result.
8 If the model was extended by the job arrival rate to depend on place of residence,
diﬀerences in regional wages would be relevant.
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region i than in j (so ai < aj), then
ci,j
m >
(µ1θj+µ2θi)
µ4
is needed for equilibrium.
Equation (7) is derived for VMi,0 = V
C
i,0, but for V
M
j,0 = V
C
j,0 we could derive a
similar condition.
From now on, we suppose that regions are identical9. So, VMi,0 = V
M
j,0 = V
M
0
and V Ci,0 = V
C
j,0 = V
C
0 . We consider three equilibriums which are characterized
by the diﬀerence between VM0 and V
C
0 . It must be the case that either (i) V
M
0 >
V C0 , (ii) V
M
0 < V
C
0 or (iii) V
M
0 = V
C
0 . No other equilibriums exist because we
have assumed that unemployed workers are identical. In the first equilibrium,
the lifetime utility of moving exceeds the lifetime utility of commuting. Hence
commuting between regions does not occur and all interregional job oﬀers induce
a residential move to the other region. In the second, the opposite is the case.
Moving to the other region does not occur and all interregional job oﬀers induce
commuting to the other region. In the remainder of this section, we focus on
the third equilibrium: VM0 = V
C
0 , and we suppose that this equilibrium exists
before and after the introduction of a road tax.
We denote the number of unemployed workers as n0, the number of
intraregional commuters who have received and accepted while unemployed an
intraregional oﬀer as ns (short distance), the number of intraregional commuters
who have received and accepted while unemployed an interregional job oﬀer but
who move residence as nm, and the number of interregional commuters as nl
(long distance). The size of the labour force is normalized to 1. It follows that
n0+ ns + nm +nl = 1 so n0, ns, nm, and nl can be interpreted as probabilities
of being in a certain labour/ housing market state. Further, we distinguish
between unemployed individuals with a moving or commuting strategy, and
employ therefore nM0 and n
C
0 , where n
M
0 + n
C
0 = n0.
Following the literature on congestion, let us presume now that the
interregional commuting costs are endogenously determined, because these costs
depend positively on the number of interregional commuters due to road
9Given identical regions, ai = aj , and we will see later on that the value of the housing
rents do not play any role in the model, so our results are consistent with endogenous and
exogenous housing rents.
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congestion. So, c = c [nl] > 0, where c [·] is a continuous increasing function
of its argument.
The assumption of identical regions implies that equation (7) can be written
as:
c [nl] =m (δ + λ) (8)
Hence, in this equilibrium, the interregional commuting costs are equal to
the discounted residential moving costs, where the discounting occurs based on
the sum of the discount and separation rate. Discounting occurs because the
residential moving costs are paid upfront whereas the commuting costs are paid
each period during the whole job spell. So workers take into account the risk of
becoming unemployed, because the increase in the flow utility due to moving is
lost when the workers become unemployed.
Recall that we have presumed that V C0 = V
M
0 . Based on (8), it can easily
be seen given which parameter values this type of equilibrium exists. If c [0] >
m (δ + λ), then VM0 > V
C
0 ; if c [1− n0] < m (δ + λ) then V C0 > VM0 . Hence,
VM0 = V
C
0 if c [0] < m (δ + λ) < c [1− n0].
According to equation (8), the number of commuters, nl, is endogenously
determined and depend on the moving costs, since the interregional commuting
costs depend on the number of commuters, and the interregional commuting
costs are equal to the discounted moving costs. In equilibrium, the number
of interregional commuters nl are an increasing function of residential moving
costs. Because the residential moving costs are exogenous, equation (8) implies
that the commuting costs are given and hence the demand for commuting is
perfect price elastic.
Now suppose that the government introduces a road tax on the congested
roads to deal with the external costs of commuting. The equilibrium condition
in equation (8) yields then that the commuting costs including the road tax are
equal to the discounted residential moving costs. Hence, c [nl] = g [nl]+τ , where
g [nl] denotes the real commuting costs (g3 > 0) and τ denotes the tax. Thus,
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∂c[nl]
∂τ = 0,
∂nl
∂τ < 0,
∂ns
∂τ > 0,
∂nM0
∂τ > 0,
∂nC0
∂τ < 0. The commuting costs, inclusive
road tax, do not depend on the tax, because the demand for commuting is
perfect price elastic. The tax induces more unemployed workers to choose MS,
which results in less interregional commuters and less congestion but at the same
time induces more regional moves that are costly. The welfare implications of
the road tax are further analysed in the following section.
4 Welfare Eﬀects of Road Pricing
Road pricing makes it more expensive to commute between regions and we have
seen that it induces more workers to choose MS. Hence, road pricing induces
more costly moves but less congested interregional connections. This raises the
question what is the optimal road tax? Further, and importantly, to what extent
does the optimal tax diﬀer from the standard Pigouvian tax policy, which claims
that the optimal tax is such that the tax is equal to the marginal external costs,
but which is usually applied to a static model. These questions are answered
using a social welfare function. We assume that the revenue from the tax is
redistributed as a lump sum transfer to each individual in the labour force.
In the current paper, the focus is how congestion and residential moving
behaviour are interrelated based on a labour market search model. Congested
roads are not only used by commuters, but also by other road users. To
simplify the analysis, we impose the assumption that other users are perfect
price inelastic. This assumption can be interpreted as a simplification of the
assumption that other users are less price elastic than commuters. This
assumption seems valid in the light of (8) which shows that commuters are
perfect price elastic10.
We distinguish again between the three types of equilibriums that may occur
before and after the introduction of the road tax: i) VMi,0 > V
C
i,0, ii) V
M
i,0 < V
C
i,0
and iii) VMi,0 = V
C
i,0. We will call a combination of a equilibrium before the road
tax with an equilibrium after the road tax an ’outcome’.
10This result applies only in the equilibrium defined by VM0 = V
C
0 .
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To investigate the welfare implications for the diﬀerent outcomes we define
an additive social welfare function (SWF) which is equal to the sum of lifetime
utilities enjoyed by all types of workers. Hence:
SWF = n0V0 + nsVs + nlVl + nm (Vs −m) + T (9)
where T is the total discounted revenue from the road tax in al future periods
which is equal to 1δnlτ . This SWF is based on the lifetime utilities of workers
when the economy is in steady state equilibrium11. In the steady state, the
SWF measures the weighted lifetime utility a worker expects to enjoy where the
weights are determined by the probability of being in a certain labour/ housing
market state. Note that workers who move residence pay moving costs to enjoy
life time utility Vs, so nm workers pay m.
To evaluate the eﬀect of a road tax, the SWF ’s in two specific equilibriums
are compared (SWF 1 − SWF 0). From now on, the superscript 0 refers to the
baseline economy without a road tax and the superscript 1 refers to an economy
with a road tax.
The equilibrium condition, m (δ + λ) = c [nl] = g [nl] + τ , which has been
derived in the previous section, can be applied. Note that m (δ + λ) is not
aﬀected by the road tax, so this condition implies that g

n0l

= g

n1l

+ τ ,
i.e. the real commuting costs before the road tax, g

n0l

, are equal to the real
commuting costs inclusive road pricing, g

n1l

+ τ .
It can be easily seen that the road tax has no eﬀect on the unemployment
rate and also no eﬀect on the number of workers who find a job in their place of
residence, ns, because neither the job oﬀer probabilities nor the job acceptance
probability are aﬀected by the road tax (for a formal proof, see Appendix C)12.
Table 1 presents all six relevant outcomes which may occur13. We emphasize
11No intermediate dynamics are measured or valuated.
12Note that in Parry and Bento (2001) and other labour market studies, the quantity of
labour supply is reduced. This is not the case in the current paper.
13Three of the nine outcomes mentioned in Table 1 do not occur, because these outcomes
imply an increase in interregional commuting due to road pricing, which is inconsistent with
the model (and intuition).
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here that the tax may not be optimally set e.g. due to absence of information
by the government, so we focus on an arbitrarily set road tax.
Table 1. Eﬀects of road tax on welfare
Equilibrium after road tax
VM0 > V
C
0 V
M
0 = V
C
0 V
M
0 < V
C
0
Equilibrium VM0 > V
C
0 I: No
before road VM0 = V
C
0 II: No IV : Gain
tax VM0 < V
C
0 III: Loss V : Ambiguous V I: No
Let us first concentrate on three outcomes that result in a road tax regime
for which holds that VM0 > V
C
0 so interregional commuting does not occur
when the road tax is introduced. These outcomes are labelled in the table as
outcomes I, II, and III. For outcome I there is obviously no welfare eﬀect
since interregional commuting does not occur before the road tax. Outcome II
occurs when before the road tax was introduced, interregional commuting was
equally alternative as residential moving, but due to the road tax commuting
is not an acceptable option any more. So after the introduction of the road
tax the condition c[0] > m (δ + s) holds. Interestingly, forcing all commuters
oﬀ the interregional roads has no negative (or positive) welfare implications.
Although we will see that the tax has been set too high, in the sense that the
tax is not welfare maximizing, it does not reduce welfare. Clearing the roads
from interregional commuters does not result in a welfare loss, because the
interregional commuters are not worse oﬀ by switching to residential moving.
The latter is true, since moving was an equally alternative before the road tax.
We find that this result is relevant, because it is often unknown how commuters
will react to an introduction of a road tax. This result provides some room for a
learning process for the tax collectors, because there is no welfare loss connected
with overtaxing.
In outcome III residential moving does not occur before the road tax is
introduced, but commuting does not occur after the road tax. It illustrates
13
the eﬀect of a road tax scheme with suﬃciently high taxes to eliminate all
interregional commuting. All commuters are ’forced’ to choose to move, which
none of them preferred in the baseline situation, and this results in a welfare loss.
Because interregional commuting is absent after the road tax scheme has been
implemented, there is no tax revenue collected, which may have compensated
the welfare loss. This result is also important, because it shows explicitly when
a road tax will reduce welfare. The message is here that if all commuters switch
to moving residence, the tax has been set too high.
Let us now consider outcome IV , when one observes both interregional
commuting and residential moves before and after the introduction of road tax,
so VM0 = V
C
0 both before and after the road tax. Outcome IV implies that
the number of interregional commuters and the number of residential movers
change as a result of the road tax. It can be shown that lifetime utilities, V0,
Vs, Vl, and (Vs −m) do not change as a result of the road tax (see Appendix B
for a formal proof). The lifetime utility of the interregional commuters does not
change because the commuting costs (inclusive the tax) do not change. Further
it follows that Vl = Vs−m. As a consequence, any change in nl and nm does not
have any impact on the SWF (see equation (9) ). The impact of road pricing
on the SWF is therefore equal to the discounted tax revenue paid in all future
periods (see appendix B):
SWF 1 − SWF 0 = 1
δ
n1l τ = T > 0 (10)
The welfare gain arises because of the reduction in congestion externality.
The gain is equal to the standard first-best Pigouvian tax. Equation (10) implies
that there is a positive welfare gain because n1l > 0. Figure 1 illustrates the
welfare eﬀect of a road tax.
As discussed in section 2, the opportunity of moving residence induces the
demand for commuting to become perfect price elastic (see Figure 1). In Figure
1, the horizontal line is the inverse demand function for commuting, which
is equal to the interregional commuting costs and the discounted residential
14
Figure 1: Welfare eﬀects of a road tax - outcome IV
nl
1 nl
0
Number of
interregional
commuters
Interregional
commuting costs
per commuter
m(δ+λ)A
B
??
c[nl0]
c[nl1] }τ
? C
Gain
c[nl1]=c[nl0]=g[nl0]
g[nl0]
Note: c[nl] denotes the commuting costs including the road tax. g[nl]
denotes the commuting costs excluding the road tax.
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moving costs m (δ + λ). The congestion cost function c

n0l

indicates that the
commuting costs per commuter increase in the total number of commuters. The
intersection of the inverse demand function for commuting and the congestion
cost function is point A, which indicates an equilibrium with n0l commuters.
Due to the road tax, the congestion cost curve moves upwards because of
the extra costs the interregional commuters have to pay, so the equilibrium
shifts to point B. The number of interregional commuters drops from n0l to n
1
l .
The area between n0l and n
1
l and the horizontal commuting inverse demand
function is equal to the reduction in the commuting costs in the economy,

c

n1l

− c

n0l
 
n0l − n1l

. The reduction in commuting costs is equal to the
increase in residential moving costs, (δ + λ)

m

n1l − n0l

. Clearly, c

n1l

=
c

n0l

= g

n0l

= g

n1l

+ τ , so the cost of commuting do not change due to
the road tax, but the costs g

n1l

are less than g

n0l

. The commuting costs
excluding road tax, g

n0l

, are determined by point C. The tax revenue in the
figure is the shaded rectangle. The rectangle should be maximized to maximize
welfare (see Verhoef (2004)). Because the demand for commuting is perfect
price elastic the welfare gain of road pricing is equal to the tax revenue.
Now consider outcome V . The baseline situation is that workers do not move
between regions, but given the road tax, interregional moving and commuting
occur both. For this outcome, the commuting costs increase due to the road
tax, because m (δ + λ) = g

n1l

+ τ > c

n0l

. The welfare eﬀects can be written
as (see Appendix B):
SWF 1 − SWF 0 = n0l
#
g

n0l

− g

n1l

− τ
(δ + λ)
$
+
1
δ
n1l τ (11)
The first term on the right hand side measures the welfare loss due to the
increase in the costs of finding a job in another region. It is negative because
n0l < n
1
l and g
3[nl] > 0, The second term measures the welfare gain because the
congestion externality is internalized. It is note the case that of of the opposite
eﬀects dominates the other. Therefore the welfare eﬀects are ambiguous in
outcome V . Figure 2 illustrates the welfare eﬀect of a road tax for outcome V .
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Figure 2: Welfare eﬀects of a road tax - outcome V
nl
1 nl
0
Number of
interregional
commuters
Interregional
commuting costs
per commuter
m(δ+λ)
Loss c [nl0]
c[nl1]
?
?
A
B
τ}
C?
Gain
Note: c[nl] denotes the commuting costs including the road tax. g[nl]
denotes the commuting costs excluding the road tax.
c[nl1]
g[nl1]
c[nl0]=g[nl0]
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The initial equilibrium is point A, so workers do not move residence between
regions,

n0m = 0

, because the discounted moving costs exceed the commuting
costs. This can be seen in Figure 2 because the horizontal commuting inverse
demand function is above point A. As in Figure 1, the congestion cost curve
moves upwards because of the road tax, so the new equilibrium is in point B. In
the new equilibrium some workers choose MS, so the commuting costs in point
B are equal to m (δ + λ). The road tax results in lower real commuting g

n1l

as indicated by point C. The welfare gain due to less congestion is equal to the
rectangle with the shaded vertical lines. The gain is internalized via the road tax.
The welfare gain is not equal to the tax revenue, because the commuting costs
increase. The ambiguity of outcome V arises because of another eﬀect which
results in a welfare loss that is illustrated by the rectangle with the shaded
horizontal lines. This welfare loss is due to the additional cost of moving for
n0−n1 workers, who experience higher costs compared to the initial equilibrium
without road tax. Whether or not the overall welfare eﬀect is positive or negative
in outcome V depends on the specific parameters of the model. For example,
if g

n1l

is large, then the welfare eﬀects are more likely to be negative. The
standard Pigouvian tax policy does not hold here, because in equilibrium an
alternative option (moving residence) is not acceptable.
When workers never move residence (before and after the introduction of
the road tax), then the demand for interregional commuting is price inelastic
(outcome V I), so the road tax does not aﬀect welfare.
Let us now discuss the main assumptions which drive our results. These are
the assumptions regarding the presence of residential moving costs and imperfect
information in the labour market. Unemployed workers search for jobs given
incomplete information about the location of the job openings and one of the
implications is excess commuting: workers commute to other regions for which
they are not compensated by means of higher wages or lower housing rents. The
main results are that under specific circumstances the welfare maximizing road
tax maximizes road tax revenue, but that a road tax may have negative welfare
implications under some circumstances.
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We have presumed that all workers are identical, but this is generally not
the case. It may be useful to allow for heterogeneity of moving costs (moving
costs may be higher for some workers than for others, for example, due to
stronger local personal networks). Heterogeneous moving costs aﬀect the main
finding for outcome IV , which states that the welfare maximizing road tax
maximizes road tax revenue. This result relies on the perfect price elastic
demand for commuting, which is derived from homogenous moving costs. Given
heterogeneity of moving costs the demand for commuting is not perfect price
elastic anymore. Heterogeneous moving costs do not aﬀect the main finding of
outcome V , which is that a road tax may have negative welfare implications.
5 Conclusion
We have studied how congestion and residential moving behaviour are related
to each other employing a job search model allowing for search imperfections.
Depending on the amount of commuting and residential moving between regions,
we demonstrate that a congestion tax may lead to both welfare losses and gains.
Under the following circumstances the model predicts when to expect welfare
losses or gains:
i) When workers move residence and commute interregionally at the same
time before and after the introduction of a road tax, a road tax induces a
positive welfare gain, because of the reduction in the congestion externality. In
this situation the road tax that maximizes the road tax revenue will maximize
overall welfare. Even if the tax collectors set the road tax price too high and
clear the roads from commuting traﬃc it does not induce a welfare loss.
ii) When interregional residential moves do not occur before the introduction
of the road tax, then the welfare eﬀect of a road tax may be positive or negative.
When interregional commuting does not occur after the road tax has been
introduced the welfare eﬀect is negative.
The model can easily be extended in many ways. For example, we have
focussed on workers who belong to one-earner households, but the case of
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two-earner households deserves attention, since for these households, the
residential moving decision is less straightforward. Further we would like to
consider endogenous wages, non-identical regions, and diﬀerent kind of price
formation in housing markets. These are to be examined in future work.
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A Appendix - Derivation of lifetime utility
In this appendix we first define the steady state lifetime utilities of workers who
choose MS. Then we write the lifetime utility of an unemployed who chooses
MS,VMi,0,t, as a function of flow utilities.
Note that given equation (2), the lifetime utility of an unemployed worker
who knows what he will choose MS when becoming unemployed, VMi,i,t, is defined
as:
VMi,i,t =
1
1 + δ

vi,i,t + λiV
M
i,0,t+1 + (1− λi)VMi,i,t+1

(12)
In steady state the above equation can be written as:
VMi,i =
vi,i + λiV
M
i,0
δ + λi
(13)
The steady state lifetime utility of an unemployed in region i, VMi,0 , and in
region j, VMj,0 , as defined in equation (1) can be written as:
VMi,0 =
vi,0 + θiV
M
i,i + θj

VMj,j −m

δ + θi + θj
(14)
and:
VMj,0 =
vj,0 + θjV
M
j,j + θi

VMi,i −m

δ + θi + θj
(15)
Substituting VMj,0 into V
M
j,j (as defined by equation (13)) we obtain:
VMj,j =
(δ + θi + θj) vj,j + λjvj,0 + θiλj

VMi,i −m

(δ + λj) (δ + θi + θj)− θjλj
(16)
Substituting equation (16) and (13) into equation (14), we obtain:
VMi,0 =
1
δ
(µ1 (vi,0 − θjm) + µ2 (vj,0 − θim) + µ3vi,i + µ4vj,j) (17)
where the µ3s are defined in section 2 after equation (3). Table A.1 shows
how the µ3s depend on the exogenous parameters (δ,λ, θ).
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Table A.1 Weights
δ λ θ
µ1 + + −
µ2 − + −/+
µ3 − − +
µ4 − − +
B Appendix - Welfare analysis
In this appendix, we will define the social welfare function (SWF ). The additive
SWF is defined using lifetime utilities:
SWF = n0V0 + nsVs + nlVl + nm (Vs −m) + T (18)
where T = 1δnlτ is the discounted revenue from the road tax in all future
periods14 .
To evaluate the welfare implications of a road tax we compare the SWF
in two steady states (SWF 1 − SWF 0), where the superscript 0 defines the
equilibrium before the introduction of a road tax and the superscript 1 defines
an equilibrium after:
SWF 1 − SWF 0 = n10V 10 + n1sV 1s + n1l V 1l + n1m

V 1s −m

+ T (19)
−

n00V
0
0 + n
0
sV
0
s + n
0
l V
0
l + n
0
m

V 0s −m

It can easily be shown (see Appendix C) that the number of unemployed,
n0, and intraregional commuters, ns, do not depend on τ , so n10 = n
0
0 = n0 and
n1s = n
0
s = ns. Hence (19) can be rewritten as:
14We have assumed that the revenue is redistributed as a lump sum transfer to each
individual in the labour force, which does not aﬀect the labour market search strategies. This
is identical to assuming that the tax collector keeps the tax revenue for lump sum transfers and
let the tax collector enter the SWF . Consequently, the lump sum transfers are not included
in the flow utilities.
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SWF 1 − SWF 0 = n0V 10 + nsV 1s + n1l V 1l + n1m

V 1s −m

+ T (20)
−

n0V
0
0 + nsV
0
s + n
0
l V
0
l + n
0
m

V 0s −m

Equation (20) will be the basis of the welfare analysis. We will explicitly
use it here to derive the welfare changes for outcomes IV (equation (26)) and
outcome V (equation (29)). The welfare changes for the other outcomes can be
analysed similarly.
B.1 Outcome IV
We first derive equation (10). Outcome IV implies the presence of both
residential moves and interregional commuting before and after the introduction
of the road tax. For outcome IV , we defined that VM0 = V
C
0 = V0 (see section
3). To derive the welfare changes we will show that 1) lifetime utilities do not
change due to the road tax, so VM00 = V
M1
0 , V
0
s = V
1
s , V
0
l = V
1
l and 2) the
number of interregional commuters and residential movers do not change due
to the tax. Thus, the welfare gain will be equal to the tax revenue.
1) The steady state lifetime utility of an unemployed who chooses MS can
be written as (see appendix A, equation (17) and impose identical regions and
use equation (5)):
VM10 =
1
δ

1 + 2θ∂+λ


(−a− θm) + 2θ
∂ + λ
(w − a)

= VM00 (21)
None of the variables in equation (21) depend on the road tax, hence V 10 =
V 00 = V0.
Similarly, the lifetime utilities of the employed can be written as:
V 1s =
vs + λV0
(δ + λ)
=
w − a+ λV0
(δ + λ)
= V 0s (22)
V 1l =
v1s + λV0
(δ + λ)
=
w − a− c1 − τ + λV0
(δ + λ)
=
w − a− co + λV0
(δ + λ)
= V 0l (23)
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Hence V 1s = V
0
s = Vs and V
1
l = V
0
l = Vl. Vs does not depend on τ , because
V0 does not depend on τ Furthermore, Vl does not depend on τ because, in
equilibrium: m (δ + λ) = g [nl] + τ . The equilibrium condition also implies that
g

n0l

= g

n1l

+ τ , i.e. the total commuting costs does not depend on τ .
Further in equilibrium:
Vl =
w − a− g

n1l

− τ + λV0
(δ + λ)
(24)
=
w − a−m (δ + λ) + λV0
(δ + λ)
=
w − a+ λV0
(δ + λ)
−m
= Vs −m
Hence, the lifetime utility of interregional commuters is equal to the lifetime
utility of workers who move residence. Further, the increase in the number of
workers who has changed place of residence

n1m − n0m

must be equal to the
decrease in number of interregional commuters:
n1m − n0m = n1l − n0l (25)
Using equations (21) to (25) implies that (19) can be written as:
SWF1 − SWF 0 = T 1 = 1
δ
n1l τ (26)
B.2 Outcome V
To derive equation (11), we analyse outcome V . For this outcome, m (δ + λ) =
g

n1l

+ τ > c

n0l

, because VM00 < V
C0
0 and V
M1
0 = V
C1
0 . The welfare eﬀect
can then be written as:
SWF1 − SWF 0 = n1l V 1l + n1m

V 1s −m

+ T − n0l V 0l (27)
The number of unemployed workers and the number of employed workers
is exogenous as shown in Appendix C. The condition: m (δ + λ) = c

n1l

+ τ
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implies that V 1l =

V 1s −m

. The welfare eﬀect is:
SWF 1 − SWF 0 =

n1l + n
1
m
w − a− c1 − τ + λV0
(δ + λ)

+ T (28)
−n0l

w − a− co + λV0
(δ + λ)

The number of workers who find a job in another region does not depend
on τ , so

n1l + n
1
m

= n0l , because V
M0
0 < V
C0
0 implies that n
0
m = 0. Hence
equation (28) can be written as:
SWF 1 − SWF 0 = n0l
#
w − a− g

n1l

− τ + λV0
(δ + λ)
$
+ T (29)
−n0l
#
w − a− g

n0l

+ λV0
(δ + λ)
$
= n0l
#
g

n0l

− g

n1l

− τ
(δ + λ)
$
+
1
δ
n1l τ
C Appendix - Number of unemployed and
employed workers in steady state
In the steady state, the number of employed who become unemployed must
equal the number of unemployed who become employed. Note that 2θ times the
number of unemployed workers, n0, will find a job during a period. Furthermore,
the exogenous separation rate times the number of employed, 1 − n0, is equal
to the number of workers who become unemployed each period. In the steady
state:
2θn0 − λ (1− n0) = 0 (30)
So,
n0 =
λ
2θ + λ
(31)
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Using a similar approach, it can be shown that the number of workers ns,nl,
and nm are defined by:
ns =
θ
2θ + λ
= nl + nm (32)
Because θ and λ are exogenously given, it follows that n0 and ns do not
depend on the road tax τ .
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